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I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that a murder is committed in your town. You are
the next-door neighbor of the victim; so, the police come to your
door and ask you to accompany them to the police station to clear
your name. They explain that questioning neighbors is a routine
procedure, and, naturally, you comply. During questioning, the
police ask you, “By any chance do you own a Mossberg 500
shotgun?” It just so happens that you do. You purchased the
shotgun for home protection when you had your first child. Before
answering the question, however, you realize that the police are
probably asking you about this particular type of gun because it
was the murder weapon. As an avid Law and Order fan, you fear
that revealing the truth might make you the lead suspect in the
murder case. So you do not answer the question. Instead, you say
nothing. You even pat yourself on the back for remembering that
you have a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and your
silence cannot be used against you. Or can it?
The Supreme Court has insisted, time and again, that history
defines our right against self-incrimination. 1 Justice Felix
*J.D. Candidate, 2015, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois;
B.A., 2012, in Psychology, Indiana University. A special thanks to Professor
Timothy O’Neill, whose passion for criminal procedure is so contagious that I
was inspired to write my comment on it. Thanks to my amazing editors, Greg
Klapman, Joe Swee and Ben O’Connor. Finally, I am grateful for Professor
Susan Brody, who has been my mentor throughout my law school career.
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Frankfurter, 2 for instance, noted that the “privilege against selfincrimination is a specific provision of which it is peculiarly true
that ‘a page of history is worth a volume of logic.’” 3 Similarly,
Chief Justice Earl Warren stated that the “privilege against selfincrimination is a right that was hard-earned by our forefathers.
The reasons for its inclusion in the Constitution—and the
necessities for its preservation—are to be found in the lessons of
history.” 4 History, however, has not provided all of the answers. 5
A recent Supreme Court decision, Salinas v. Texas, 6 has left
many second-guessing what exactly is protected by the Fifth
Amendment. This Comment details the recent holding in Salinas
and the holding’s consequences for the privilege against selfincrimination. Part II summarizes how the right was created and
constitutionalized in the Fifth Amendment. Part III dissects the
Thank you for everything you do.
This comment is dedicated to my wonderful family in Texas. “I love you
night and day.”
1. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION xv (2d ed. 1986).
Professor Dick Helmholz and his co-authors recognize that sometimes it is
said the privilege “transcends its origins.” R. H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 5
(1997). However, the history remains central for most interpreters. Id.
2. In Ullmann v. United States, Justice Frankfurter wrote that:
[I]t [were] better for an occasional crime to go unpunished than that the
prosecution should be free to build up a criminal case, in whole or in
part, with the assistance of enforced disclosures by the accused. The
privilege against self-incrimination serves as a protection to the
innocent as well as to the guilty, and we have been admonished that it
should be given a liberal application.
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427 (1956).
3. Id. at 438 (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349
(1921)). The Court explained that the privilege against self-incrimination is
not a “vague, undefinable, admonitory provisions of the Constitution whose
scope is inevitably addressed to changing circumstances.” Id. at 438. History,
rather than circumstances, is key. Id. at 438–39. The court further
emphasized that the privilege’s history shows that the clause should not be
interpreted literally or rigidly define. Id. at 438.
4 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955). Chief Justice Warren
further noted that the privilege can only fulfill its intended purpose if applied
liberally. Id. at 162.
5. See HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 5 (explaining that although a
look into the privilege’s origins may contribute to an understanding of the
privilege’s contours, “the understanding has proved elusive”). There is no
complete account of the history of the privilege. Id. And the privilege has been
more controversial than might be expected. Id. at 16. Indeed, “the law and the
lawyers . . . have never made up their minds just what it is supposed to do or
just whom it is intended to protect.” Harry Kalven, Jr., Invoking the Fifth
Amendment – Some Legal and Impractical Considerations, 9 BULL. ATOMIC
SCI. 181, 182 (1953). Seeking an accurate and relatively objective source,
Helmholz asserts “that the true history of the privilege should be based on an
examination of its place in the procedure in . . . ordinary criminal trials.”
HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 16.
6. Salinas v. Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2174 (2013).
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Salinas opinion and explains the practical implications of the
holding for pre-Miranda, pre-arrest police questioning. Finally,
Part IV proposes that the Court resolve the problems with the
Salinas ruling by creating a new exception to the express
invocation requirement.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The English Origins of the Privilege against SelfIncrimination
In the early 1200’s, the English judicial system was divided
into two parts: the ecclesiastical courts and the non-ecclesiastical
courts. 7 The criminally accused usually faced trial by
compurgation, which required the accused to simply take an oath
and proclaim his guilt or innocence. 8 The oath was considered an
appeal to the divine, and many believed the truth would be
uncovered with God as a witness. 9 The oath forced the accused to
choose among three evils: refuse to take the oath and be punished,
declare his innocence under oath and be subject to both the
natural and supernatural penalties for perjury, or declare his guilt
under oath and incriminate himself. Eventually, though, trial by
compurgation proved to be ineffective, and a more proactive
procedure took its place. 10 The new method still involved the
taking of an oath, called the inquisitional oath or the oath ex
officio, to answer truthfully a series of questions about the
accused’s involvement in the crime. 11 Thus, the new method
preserved the selection among three evils. 12 Under the oath ex
7. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION
260–61 (1988); see also HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 18 (discussing the
“contest for control between rival court systems”).
8. MARK BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 4 (1980). See also HELMHOLZ ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 33 (explaining that trial by compurgation called on the
accused to swear under oath that they are innocent).
9. See BERGER, supra note 8, at 4 (noting that trial by compurgation often
involved people other than the accused taking the oath and attesting to the
trustworthiness of the accused).
10. See HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 18 (describing the ecclesiastical
courts’ adoption of the oath ex officio).
11 LEVY, supra note 1, at 46–47. The ensuing interrogation was intended
to extract a confession from the accused person while he was unaware of the
charges against him. Id. at 47 See also HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 32
(describing how the use of the oath ex officio was “standard procedure” in the
ecclesiastical courts).
12. The oath ex officio’s “requirements [were] so easily met that
challenging its legality would have required an exceptional situation.”
HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 33. Indeed, the oath has been compared to
a trap where the accused stands only a slim chance of escaping. BERGER,
supra note 8, at 6. Refusing to take the oath resulted in imprisonment for
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officio system, though, a new element was added. After taking the
oath, the accused would be interrogated and then a judge would be
the one to determine his guilt or innocence. 13
The oath ex officio became fantastically unpopular 14 when the
procedure played an intensified role in the ecclesiastical courts,
which were becoming increasingly concerned with heresy. 15
Sometimes interrogators questioned on matters unrelated to the
specific charge to secure any conviction or to make the accused
give evidence against himself. 16 Ultimately, the mounting
opposition to the oath ex officio 17 led to the elimination of the

contempt or other forms of punishment. HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 1, at
101. And, in practice, the oath almost always secured a conviction. Id.
13. BERGER, supra note 8, at 6; HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 32. The
accused was often times not told of the charges or evidence against him. Id.
14. HELMHOLZ ET AL, supra note 1, at 39 (showing that the official records
of the English ecclesiastical courts contained objections to the oath “as
contrary to the law of the church”).
One particularly noteworthy objector is Richard Ramsford, who refused to
take the oath because “he was not bound by the law to respond.” Ex officio v.
Udall, 1 State Trials 1271, 1275 (1590). Another defendant also objected
because “the offense wherewithal he is charged in this article is a capitall
cryme and therefore he believeth he is not bound by lawe to answere
thereunto [sic].” Id.
15. BERGER, supra note 8, at 8 (explaining that the oath ex officio was an
“important, if not dominant, procedural technique” for controlling heresy in
England); HELMHOLZ ET AL, supra note 1, at 29 (stating that the oath was a
means of eliminating heresy and prosecuting victims of the oath for their
religious beliefs). See LEVY, supra note 1, at 54–56 (detailing the growing
concern with heresy); see also Roy Moreland, Historical Background and
Implications of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 44 KY. L.J. 267, 269
(1956) (clarifying that a general probing procedure was the cause of intense
opposition to the oath ex officio).
The followers of John Wycliffe, known as Lollards, were among those
subjected to the oath in heresy trials. Id. Wycliffe was a pronounced heretic
because he deviated from the Catholic authority that controlled much of
England. Id. Wycliffe had powerful supporters, though, and was not burned to
death for his heresy, which was the typical punishment at the time. Id. His
followers still paid a price. Id. Archbishop William Courtney was determined
to eliminate Wycliffe’s deviant, heretical influence. Id. Archbishop Courtney,
with the approval of the king, called upon Wycliffe’s followers to take the oath
ex officio. Id. One of the Lollards took the oath but refused to answer questions
regarding his Catholic faith. Id. He was therefore presumed guilty and
imprisoned. Id.
16. HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 35. Many people at this time were
accustomed to questioning on the charge they were accused of. Moreland,
supra note 15, at 269. It was the act of fishing for self-incriminating evidence
by asking questions outside the scope of the charge that became strongly
debated, eventually leading to the elimination of the Ecclesiastical courts in
1640. Id.
17. “[R]efusals to take the ex officio oath are easy to find among the act
books from the years after 1560.” HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 35. The
use of lawyers in criminal cases contributed to the intensity of objections. Id.
at 41.
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ecclesiastical judicial system in 1640. 18
But the oath ex officio was not defeated but, rather, remained
in the non-ecclesiastic courts. 19 Again, the procedure seemed to
have few limits. Any person could be forced to take an oath and
answer whatever the court inquired, sometimes without being told
of the charge against him. 20 Resistance to the procedure began to
build again and culminated after the trial of John Lilburne, who
demanded an end to what he claimed was an unlawful practice. 21
In 1637, Lilburne was charged with heresy and tried in the Court
of Star Chamber. 22 He asserted that he had a right to a formal
accusation before interrogation and refused to answer any
question that was outside the scope of that charge. 23 Because of
this, the Court of Star Chamber had Lilburne whipped and
imprisoned. 24 Even so, he continued to fight against the
procedure. 25 Eventually, Parliament abolished the Court of Star
Chamber and High Commission 26 after finding that the Star
18. See generally ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY
(1955) (reiterating that the Ecclesiastical courts were abolished in 1640 as a
result of opposition to its procedures).
19. HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 18.
20. GRISWOLD, supra note 18, at 2. Those who refused to answer questions
were often times tortured until they succumbed. Id.
21. LILBURNE’S TRIAL, 3 HOW. ST. TR. 1315 (1673); 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE 282, § 2250 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
Lilburne’s sought to challenge the court and the inquisitorial procedure, to
paint the court as oppressors, and to open the juror’s eyes to the unjust and
invasive practice). LEVY, supra note 1, at 302–09. Lilburne’s ultimate success
was due in great part to all the fuss that he stirred up among the spectators by
focusing their attention on how few individual liberties the court
acknowledged when Lilburne’s life was at stake. Id.; see also BERGER, supra
note 8, at 15 (stating that Lilburne’s triumph was the impact he had on the
public opinion). “When Lilburne finally completed his defense with a long
emotional appeal to the jury, the audience broke out in loud shouts of ‘Amen,
Amen.’” LEVY, supra note 1, at 309.
22. Wendy McElroy, Was Freeborn John Tortured in Vain? The Importance
of the Right against Self-Incrimination, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Aug. 16,
2011), http://fee.org/freeman/detail/was-freeborn-john-tortured-in-vain.
23. WILLIAM COBBETT, COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE
TRIALS 1332 (1809).
Lilburne objected only to questioning he believed was not probative of the
charge. LEVY, supra note 1, at 273. And so he “demanded to know the reason
for questions which did not seem relevant to the cause of his imprisonment.”
Id.
24. See HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 38 (discussing the consequences
of refusing to take the oath or to answer the Court’s questions under the oath).
A defendant could be held “pro confesso,” meaning that the court would
presume a confession from the accused was made or, as in Lilburne’s case, the
Court could punish him “merely for contempt.” Id.
25. Moreland, supra note 15, at 273.
26. See HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 102 (discussing Wigmore’s
opinion that John Lilburne and his persistent objections in the Star Chamber
led to the eradication of the Court of Star Chamber and the High
Commission); see also WIGMORE, supra note 21, at 289 (asserting that the oath
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Chamber sentence was unlawful. 27 The oath ex officio died a
belated death after a statute barring the oath was enacted in
1662. 28 The privilege against self-incrimination eventually became
a fundamental part of the common law as a result of the oath ex
officio being held as “against the liberty of the subject.” 29

B. The Privilege against Self-Incrimination Follows
Colonists to America
When the British settled the American colonies, they brought
the common law legal principles with which they were familiar. 30
But the colonists endured their own experiences that reinvigorated
opposition to inquisitorial practices and contributed in part to the
American recognition of the privilege against self-incrimination. 31
American colonists engaged in inquisitional practices even though
they knew of the criticism such practices attracted in England. 32
The Salem witch trials of the 1690s were the most egregious
example of such inquisitions. 33 Mobs accused many women of
witchcraft, a charge they were not able to refute. 34 Then the mobs
interrogated the accused and either tortured them to elicit
confessions or killed them for not complying. 35 Fortunately, such

ex officio was “swept away” with the Star Chamber and High Commission
Courts).
27. BERGER, supra note 8, at 18 (describing the results of Lilburne’s
opposition to the practices of the Court of Star Chamber).
Some scholars believe that Lilburne was not a significant figure in the
development of the privilege. HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 244–45.
Helmholz argues that Lilburne fought for the right to a defense counsel and
claimed that the jury has the power to nullify or be the judge of the law. Id.
Lilburne’s railings against self-incrimination were, in Helmholz’s view, merely
a consequential or side argument. Id. In support of this contention, Helmholz
notes that the issue was mentioned only twice in the trial reports. Id. In one
instance, Lilburne asserted the privilege by saying he would not answer any
question that concerned himself. Id. In the other instance, he refused to
answer to or even look at incriminating papers the prosecution offers to him.
Id. Even in these instances, Holmholz claims, Lilburne’s main goal was not as
much to fight for the privilege against self-incrimination as it was to get the
prosecutor to bear the burden of proof. Id.
28. 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 440
(1883).
29. John H. Wigmore, The Privilege Against Self-Crimination; Its History.,
15 HARV. L. REV. 610, 625 (1902).
30. Abe Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25
J. CLEV. BAR ASS’N 91, 97 (1954).
31. Moreland, supra note 15, at 272–73.
32. R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935).
33. JEFFREY A. JENKINS, THE AMERICAN COURTS: A PROCEDURAL
APPROACH 68 (2011).
34. BERGER, supra note 8, at 22.
35. Id.; Moreland, supra note 15, at 273.
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inquisitional practices never made their way into colonial courts. 36
However, it seems almost indisputable that such instances are
relevant to the development of the privilege against selfincrimination in the colonies.
In 1776, the delegates of the Continental Congress came
together in Philadelphia to consider the need for independence. 37
In part because of their long disagreement with the British about
what constitutional rights were essential to the common law
tradition, the Colonists finally took action. 38 On July 4th, they
adopted the Declaration of Independence and began the battle to
freedom. Winning the war and gaining independence from Britain
triggered a need for written constitutions that enshrined the
principles of popular sovereignty and inalienable rights. 39 Virginia
was the first state to enumerate its fundamental rights in a
written constitution. 40 The Virginia Declaration of Rights,
authored by George Mason, incorporated the principle against
self-incrimination by providing that no man may “be compelled to
give evidence against himself.” 41 Despite this broad language, the
right’s scope was confined to the criminally accused during trial
because the clause was placed in Section 8. 42 The provision, thus
limited, offered far less protection than the common law
equivalent provided. 43 Though the placement and resulting
narrowing of the right was likely a mere slipup, 44 many of the

36. Pittman, supra note 32 (explaining that although the colonies allowed
inquisitorial practices, such as the Salem witch trials, “no lawyer participated
in those trials. Torture was used to obtain confessions but it was not ‘judicial’
torture”).
37. ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776–
1791 30 (1983).
38. HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 128.
39 BERGER, supra note 8, at 22.
40. LEVY, supra note 1, at 405 (recognizing that “Virginia blazed the trail
with her celebrated Declaration of Rights as a preface to her constitution”). Id.
41. 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 231–34 (1971). See also HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 134
(describing George Mason’s model for protecting the cluster of jury trial
rights).
42. LEVY, supra note 1, at 406.
43. The common law privilege was crafted to end all torturous methods of
questioning. Id. Consequently, the common law protected not only the
criminal defendant but also witnesses in criminal proceedings. Id.
44. See id. (discussing the formulation of the Virginia Declaration of
Rights).
“The provision against self-incrimination was the result of bad
draftsmanship, which is not easily explained.” Id. at 407. Mason did not
intend the clause to limit the scope of the privilege. Id. Indeed, the clause
would have been meaningless if it only applied to criminal defendants
because, at that time, the accused were not permitted to testify at their trial.
Id. Thus, the most reasonable conclusion is that the contextual meaning was
simply a product of “[t]houghtlessness, rather than indifference or purposeful
narrowing.” Id. at 408.
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states imitated Mason’s formula in their own constitutions. 45
Fortunately, this textual narrowing proved largely irrelevant
because most states understood that the enumeration of the right
stood as a symbol for the well-known and broad common law
privilege. 46 In practice, both witnesses and parties in both criminal
and civil cases enjoyed protection. 47
The most important step in constitutionalizing the privilege
against self-incrimination occurred with the framing of the United
States Bill of Rights. 48 Although the Constitutional Convention
was called only to revise the Articles of Confederation, the
delegates completed a much greater task, framing our
Constitution. 49 In so doing, however, the Convention enumerated
only a random selection of rights in the Constitution. 50 Perceived
as insufficiently protective of individual rights, the Constitution
was criticized by many. 51
Throughout the ratification conventions, anti-federalists
pressed for a bill of rights to protect the people from the federal
government. 52 The anti-federalists succeeded, as “more than onehalf of the ratifying states recommended amendments, and four
recommended entire bills of rights.” 53 Of particular importance,
four states – Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode
Island – hoped to constitutionalize the privilege against selfincrimination by proposing a version of section 8 of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights. 54 In 1789, the First Congress recognized the
45. RUTLAND, supra note 37, at 79; see also LEVY, supra note 1, at 410
(discussing the state constitutions that followed the formulation that Mason
used in Virginia’s Declaration of Rights); HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 1, at
134 (recognizing that the Virginia Declaration became a model for many of the
other states’ constitutions).
46. LEVY, supra note 1, at 409.
47. Id. (stating, “The practice of the courts was simply unaffected by the
restrictions inadvertently or unknowingly inserted in Section 8.”).
48. HELMHOLZ, ET AL., supra note 1, at 15.
49. J.W. PELTASON, CORWIN AND PELTASON’S UNDERSTANDING THE
CONSTITUTION 11 (9th ed. 1982).
50. The writing of the constitutions and and bills of rights was far from
systematic. LEVY, supra note 1, at 411. After the Revolutionary war against
Britain ended, the drafters of the first constitutions “tended simply to draw up
a random catalogue of rights that seemed to satisfy their urge for a statement
of first principles.” Id.
51. BERGER, supra note 8, at 22.
In fact, some delegates mentioned the need for more enumerated rights
before the convention adjourned. LEVY, supra note 1, at 414. Although many
of the delegates were open to such a set of amendments, they were simply too
eager to return home. Id. See HELMHOLZ, ET AL., supra note 1, at 136
(explaining that the convention ended without adopting a declaration of rights
because of delegates’ aversion to the Philadelphia weather).
52. HELMHOLZ, ET AL., supra note 1, at 136. Federalists were not
necessarily opposed to the protection of individual liberties; rather, they
believed a bill was not necessary to provide that protection. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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need for a Bill of Rights. 55 James Madison drafted a proposed set
of protections that included the privilege against selfincrimination. 56 But Madison created a new formula not yet seen
in any state constitution. 57
Madison’s privilege appeared in the Fifth Amendment and
stated that no person shall “be compelled to be a witness against
himself.” 58 Importantly, Madison did not place the clause in a
section specifically concerned with the criminally accused. 59 This
meant that the provision extended to witnesses and parties in
criminal and civil cases at any stage of the proceedings. 60 The
specific language used, “witness against himself,” when taken
literally, included any evidence that would publicly humiliate the
person, even if the information did not incriminate him. 61
Madison’s proposal was sent to a committee where one speaker,
John Laurence, moved to amend the privilege to limit its reach to
criminal cases. 62 The committee approved the amendment and
adopted a new clause stating that no person “shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” 63 This new
wording still shielded both witnesses and parties in a criminal
case but no longer offered protection to anyone in a civil case. 64
This amendment seemed to take into consideration the idea that
the criminally accused, specifically, feel a sense of pressure that is
not mirrored by a witness or defendant in a civil case. Thus, it
purported to protect this criminal suspect from historical
55. BERGER, supra note 9, at 22.
56. Id. at 23.
57. HELMHOLZ, ET AL., supra note 1, at 137 (discussing James Madison’s
deviation from any proposal presented by the states); LEVY, supra note 1, at
410 (discussing the different phraseologies used by colonial constitutions).
58. LEVY, supra note 1, at 410.
59. Id. at 423; id. at 427.
60. Id.
61. LEVY, supra note 1, at 423–24 (explaining that “[b]y its terms the
clause could also apply to any testimony that fell short of making one
vulnerable to criminal jeopardy or civil penalty or forfeiture, but that
nevertheless exposed him to public disgrace or obloquy, or other injury to
name and reputation”).
62. Id. at 425. Laurence’s proposed amendment was more reflective of the
clause in Section 8 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. Id. Laurence’s
amendment was accepted so quickly that it seems there was no debate over
the restriction. Id. Interestingly, not even Madison debated Laurence’s
proposed amendment. Id.; see also HELMHOLZ ET AL., supra note 1, at 138
(discussing John Laurence’s suggestion to limit the privilege to criminal cases
and his argument that Madison’s proposed amendment was “a general
declaration in some degree contrary to laws passed”).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
64. LEVY, supra note 1, at 427. The self-incrimination clause was not
placed in the Sixth Amendment, where rights of the criminally accused were
located. Id. Instead, it was placed in the Fifth Amendment, which provided
procedural rights in criminal cases, a much broader scope than the Sixth
Amendment. Id. This manifests an intent to provide protection to not solely
the criminal defendant but witnesses as well. Id.
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compulsion by allowing them to stay silent in the face of a
potential implicating question.
In the mid-1960s, the Supreme Court had two opportunities
to interpret the scope of the Fifth Amendment right. 65 In the
Griffin and Miranda cases, the Supreme Court clarified the right
by explaining first that “the Fifth Amendment did not permit the
government to comment on the defendant’s failure to testify at
trial” 66 and then Miranda’s famous requirement “that before the
police can admit a defendant’s statement during a custodial
interrogation, the police must first inform him of his [right to
remain silent] and then obtain a waiver of his rights.” 67 However,
it has always been a bit of a mystery what it means to say that a
person has a right to remain silent. 68 “Miranda doesn’t say. It
requires the police to tell people that they have a right to remain
silent, but it doesn’t tell us what that right means or when it is
triggered.” 69

C. The Supreme Court Speaks up in Salinas v. Texas
When two brothers were murdered in their Houston, Texas
home, an investigation led the police to Genovevo Salinas. 70
Salinas cooperated, agreeing to have his shotgun tested for
ballistics and to accompany the police to the station for
questioning. 71 Because Salinas was not in-custody, he was not
read Miranda rights. 72 He voluntarily answered the officers’
questions until they asked a particularly incriminating question: if
the shell casings they found at the crime scene would match his
shotgun. 73 Then Salinas stayed quiet. 74 At his trial, prosecutors

65. Orin Kerr, Do You Have A Right to Remain Silent? Thoughts on the
“Sleeper” Criminal Procedure Case of the Term, Salinas v. Texas, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 17, 2013), http://www.volokh.com/2013/06/17/do-you-havea-right-to-remain-silent-thoughts-on-the-sleeper-criminal-procedure-case-ofthe-term-salinas-v-texas/.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (plurality opinion). Salinas attended a
party at the victims’ house the night before the murder. Id.
71 Id. The questioning lasted for about an hour. Id.
72. Id.; see Timothy P. O’Neill, Supreme Court Strikes a Blow Against the
Right to Remain Silent, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 17, 2013, available at http://
news.jmls.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/ONeill-July-17.pdf (explaining that
“there was no problem with the police not reading him his Miranda rights”
because he was not in custody).
73. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (plurality opinion).
74. Id. According to the officer’s testimony at trial, Salinas “looked down at
the floor, shuffled his feet, bit his bottom lip, clenched his hands in his lap,
[and] began to tighten up.” Id.
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commented on his silence and urged the jury to infer his guilt. 75
The prosecutors effectively said that an innocent person would not
react by simply remaining silent. Remaining silent, however, is
precisely what Salinas argued the Fifth Amendment gave him the
right to do in the face of an incriminating question. 76 The jury
disagreed and Salinas was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years
in prison. 77
Both appellate courts affirmed the conviction because
Salinas’s “prearrest, pre-Miranda silence was not ‘compelled’
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.” 78 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the unsettled issue of whether
the Fifth Amendment prohibits prosecutors from using a
defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as evidence of guilt. 79
However, the Court decided to “remain silent” on this big issue,
holding instead that because Salinas failed to invoke the privilege,
the scope of its protection need not be decided. 80

III. ANALYSIS
This Section of the Comment provides a detailed analysis of
Salinas and its effects. Part A summarizes the Supreme Court’s
plurality opinion. Then Parts B and C explore the consequences of
the ruling and, more importantly, the practical effect it will have
on the rights of the average American citizen.

A. The Plurality Decision
In Salinas, the plurality held that Salinas’s claim to Fifth
Amendment protection failed because a suspect must expressly
invoke his or her right against self-incrimination. 81 Crucially, the
Court found that Salinas’s mere silence failed to do so 82 and
further, that he failed to satisfy the requirements for either of the
two exceptions to this “express invocation requirement.” 83 Under
the Griffin exception, no invocation is needed when a criminal
defendant exercises his absolute “right not to testify.” 84 The Court
concluded that this exception did not apply in Salinas because
Salinas did not have such an absolute right in his voluntary
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2178–79.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2179.
80. See O’Neill, supra note 72 (explaining that the lack of resolution will
lead to a “long-simmering division of authority in lower courts”).
81. Salinas, 133 S.Ct. at 2178 (plurality opinion).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2179.
84. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 609 (1965).

832

The John Marshall Law Review

[48:821

interview with the police. 85
For purposes of this analysis, the second exception is more
important to dissect thoroughly. The Miranda exception “excuses”
a witness who fails to invoke the privilege “where governmental
coercion makes [the suspect’s] forfeiture of the privilege
involuntary.” 86 Thus, in a situation the court deems coercive, the
suspect is not required to expressly invoke the privilege. 87 The
Court concluded, though, that Salinas was not subjected to a
coercive interrogation. 88 Rather, his interview with the police was
voluntary because he was not arrested before the police
interrogation and was “free to leave at any time during the
interview.” 89
Although the Court admitted that “no ritualistic formula is
necessary in order to invoke the privilege,” the plurality found that
mere silence is not enough. 90 The plurality believed that Salinas
could easily and simply have stated that he was remaining silent
“on Fifth Amendment grounds.” 91 If he had, the Court concluded,
he would have a proper Fifth Amendment claim. 92 Because Salinas
simply stayed mute during a non-custodial interrogation, his Fifth
Amendment claim failed and the Court affirmed his conviction. 93

B. People Are Unaware of the Express Invocation Rule
What does the Salinas decision mean? What should a suspect
who agrees to talk with police before they read him his Miranda
rights do when asked an incriminating question? Of course, he
should not answer it; but now it appears that he should not
remain silent either. 94 Salinas says this suspect must say
something to invoke the Fifth Amendment – to put the police on
notice that he intends to rely on the privilege 95 – and if he does
successfully invoke it, hope that it affords him some protection. 96
85. Salinas, 133 S.Ct. at 2179 (plurality opinion).
86. Id. at 2176.
87. Id. at 2180.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955)).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2178.
93. Id. at 2176, 2178.
94. See Hank Asbill, Brian Murray & Andrew Pinson, Salinas v. Texas:
The Fifth Amendment During Pre-Arrest Interviews, JURIST (July 9, 2013),
http://jurist.org/sidebar/2013/07/asbill-murray-pinson-salinas.php (explaining
that speaking risks self-incrimination but Salinas rules out staying silent).
95. See Salinas, 133 S.Ct. at 2179 (plurality opinion) (explaining that the
government needs notice when a witness is relying on the Fifth Amendment
privilege so that it can either make its case that the testimony was not selfincriminating or it can cure through immunity).
96. Remember that the Supreme Court did not decide whether, if the
privilege were invoked, the witness would be protected from having his silence
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For all practical purposes, the current interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment will not provide adequate protection of citizens’ rights
for two basic reasons.
First, the current interpretation disadvantages the average
suspect – the very person who the Fifth Amendment seeks to
protect – because he is likely unaware of the express invocation
requirement. 97 It is unrealistic to place the burden on the suspect,
who has no more than a basic understanding of his constitutional
rights, to inform a trained government official that he intends to
rely on a right. 98 Even more, it is ignorant to expect that he can
reference it by name. 99 This is precisely what the plurality expects
of an average citizen without any constitutional or legal training.
Further, the harm done will be more widespread than might be
expected because the new rule “will . . . encourage more
noncustodial interrogations” where police are not required to read
Miranda warnings and express invocations are therefore
required. 100
As the four dissenting Justices in Salinas point out, “Salinas,
not being represented by counsel, would not likely have used the
precise words ‘Fifth Amendment’ to invoke his rights because he
would not likely have been aware of technical legal requirements,
such as a need to identify the Fifth Amendment by name.” 101 Even
if a suspect were a well-trained lawyer, though, he may still be in
trouble because the plurality failed to explain what exactly is
required for an invocation. 102 The plurality requires that a suspect
“expressly invoke the privilege against self-incrimination.” 103 Yet,
this ignores the obvious truth that “an individual who is not a
lawyer [likely does not know] that these particular words are
legally magic[.]” 104 Justice Breyer and the Justices who joined him
dissenting believed that the express-invocation rule undermines
the very purpose of the Fifth Amendment protection and “poses a
serious obstacle to those who, like Salinas, seek to assert their
basic Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, for they are likely

used against him by prosecutors at his trial. Id.
97. See O’Neill, supra note 72.
98. See Khaled Mowad, The Right to Remain Silent After Salinas v. Texas,
HARV. CIV. RTS. (June 21, 2013), http://harvardcrcl.org/2013/06/21/the-right-toremain-silent-after-salinas-v-texas/ (stating that the new rule places a heavy
burden on an individual rather than the government official).
99. See id. (noting that “unfortunately, not everyone is as conversant with
the Fifth Amendment as Justice Alito might like”).
100. O’Neill, supra note 72.
101. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2189–90 (plurality opinion) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
102. See id. at 2190 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning what exactly the
plurality opinion calls for in order to invoke the Fifth Amendment’s
protections).
103. Id. at 2178 (plurality opinion).
104. Id. at 2190 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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unaware of such linguistic detail.” 105
The realistic perspective of the dissenting Justices recognizes
that if the suspect is not well acquainted with this rule-based
approach to invoking the Fifth Amendment’s protections, he
forfeits his claim to them and his silence can be used against him
in court. “Constitutional protections should not be just for those
who have legal training and know what they need to say to the
police to invoke their rights.” 106 The plurality’s ruling complicates
the law for those who it is intended to benefit, those who are
vulnerable to compulsion by government officials. 107 He, the
citizen who the Fifth Amendment was put in place to protect,
becomes a victim of it. 108

C. People Don’t Feel Free to Leave
The plurality’s decision is largely based upon a distinction
between custodial and non-custodial settings. 109 According to the
opinion, a witness who is not in custody is free to leave at any time
and, thus, is not exposed to the coercive nature of a custodial
interrogation. 110 This distinction is crucial because a witness who
is in custody during the interrogation need not expressly invoke
the Fifth Amendment. 111 In fact, in this situation, the officer is
required to go a step further and read the witness his Miranda
rights, which advise him of his right to remain silent. 112 All of this
goes out the door, though, if the accused is not in “custody.”
To make sense of this drastic effect, one must understand how
the Court defines “custody.” In Miranda, the Supreme Court
defined a custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant

105. Id. at 2191.
106. Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence Is Not Golden, Supreme Court Says,
A.B.A J. (June 25, 2013, 6:15 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
chemerinsky_silence_is_not_golden_supreme_court_says/.
107. Tim Lynch, Salinas v. Texas, CATO INST. (June 17, 2013),
http://www.cato.org/blog/salinas-v-texas.
108. See Christopher Zara, Supreme Court Self-Incrimination Ruling: No
Right To Remain Silent Unless You Speak Up, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 26,
2013),
http://www.ibtimes.com/supreme-court-self-incrimination-ruling-noright-remain-silent-unless-you-speak-1324515 (stating that “[f]rom a common
sense perspective, Salinas was penalized for exercising his constitutional right
to remain silent . . . [and] [t]his should not be tolerated under the Fifth
Amendment”).
109. See Chemerinsky, supra note 106.
110. Salinas, 133 S.Ct. at 2180 (plurality opinion). The “inherently
compelling pressures” of interrogation apply to custodial interrogations only.
Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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way.” 113 In assessing whether the interrogation is custodial, the
Court uses a reasonable person standard. 114 Thus, the critical
question becomes: does the reasonable person feel he has “freedom
of action?” 115
Put yourself in Salinas’ shoes. You, after all, are supposed to
represent the “reasonable person.” 116 When a police officer shows
up at your door because an investigation into a murder pointed to
you as a suspect, and he asks you to accompany him to the police
station for questioning, do you, the “reasonable person”, feel at
liberty to refuse? When you are in an “interview room” at the
police station, a police-dominated atmosphere, and you are being
questioned as to your innocence, would you feel comfortable
getting up and walking out? What happens if you choose to
exercise that liberty after you are asked a potentially
incriminating question? It is not difficult to predict that a
prosecutor will use that reaction against you at trial if the Fifth
Amendment allows him to do so. So, reasonable person, do you feel
you have significant “freedom of action” now?
The reality is that a reasonable person might feel inherently
compelled to cooperate in the presence of an authority figure who
is asking for cooperation. Indeed, as Professor Dana Raigrodski
has noted, it is inaccurate to say it is the rule, and not the
exception, that an encounter with the police is non-coercive. 117
Another scholar, David A. Sklansky, agrees, stating that “anyone
who has ever been stopped by the police knows this is nonsense:
every encounter with a uniformed officer necessarily involves some
amount of apprehension, and hence some amount of psychological
if not physical coercion.” 118 Further, the results of a study done by
David K. Kessler challenge the assumption that, in so-called
“consensual encounters” with the police, a reasonable person feels
free to refuse to comply or to leave at any time. 119 The study
113. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added).
114. J.D.B. v. N. Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011) (stating that the
determination of whether the suspect is in custody involves an objective
inquiry where it is essential to ask if “a reasonable person [would] have felt he
or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave”).
115. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. See Dana Raigrodski, Breaking out of
“Custody”: A Feminist Voice in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 36 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1301, 1315 (1999) (noting that the custody inquiry involves
asking if the reasonable person would feel free to leave the interrogation).
116. See Raigrodski, supra note 115, at 1318–19 (struggling to understand
who the “infamous ‘reasonable person’” is, the author asks “[w]ho are you
Reasonable Person? I would very much like to meet you since we are so much
alike—behaving the same and all, I wonder if you and I could be friends”).
The author emphasizes that the “reasonable person” is supposed to “manifest
shared social views, values, and convictions.” Id.
117. See id. at 1319.
118. David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future
of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 319 (1997).
119. See David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth
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involved a survey 120 that described two casual encounters with the
police. 121 Most individuals answered that they would not have felt
free to leave during either encounter. 122 In fact, the survey
respondents, on average, did not even feel “somewhat free to
leave.” 123
To test Kessler’s results, 124 Alisa Smith, Erik Dolgoff, and
Dana Speer designed an experiment during which they observed
the actual reactions people have to encounters with police. 125
Researchers structured “real” encounters between officers and the
eighty-three study participants and then observed the latters’
reactions. 126 The officers were instructed to approach the
individuals, ask to speak with them, and request information,
including their name, identification, and reason for being on
campus. 127 All the participants complied; not one refused to
Amendment’s Seizure Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 51 (2009)
(showing results from a survey on consensual encounters with police).
120. See id. at 53 (explaining that the survey was the first to address how
people actually feel in “simple encounters with law enforcement officers”). The
purpose was to gauge people’s actual reaction to a police officer who asked
them questions in a casual environment. Id. at 68. Respondents included 406
randomly selected residents of Boston, Massachusetts. Id. at 52. The survey
was distributed in four locations of the Boston area and surveyors avoided
favoring people of any particular demographic or socioeconomic status. Id. at
69. The questionnaire was one page and asked respondents to read the
scenario and rate on a scale from one to five how “free to leave” they would
feel. Id.
121. Id. at 52. One scenario was an encounter with the police on a public
sidewalk and the other an encounter with the police on a bus. Id.
122. Id. at 73. The results of the survey showed that even those people who
are aware of their legal right to leave or terminate the encounter with the
police still did not feel free to leave. Id. Respondents reported that in both
scenarios they would not feel free to leave when asked questions by the police
officer. Id. at 74. On the “free to leave scale,” one represented “not free to leave
or say no” and five represented “completely free to leave or say no.” Id. at 69.
On average, respondents scored a 2.61 for the public sidewalk scenario and
2.52 for the bus scenario on the “free to leave” scale. Id. at 74.
123. Id. at 75.
124. Although David Kessler’s survey experiment was the “first set of
empirical evidence that addresses whether or not actual people would feel free
to terminate simple encounters with law enforcement officers,” it involved
people answering a questionnaire about how they predict they would act in an
encounter with a police. Id. at 53. The survey did not demonstrate how they
would actually react. Id. And “research has demonstrated that people do not
accurately predict their responses. Alisa M. Smith et al., Testing Judicial
Assumptions of the “Consensual” Encounter: An Experimental Study, 14 FLA.
COASTAL L. REV. 285, 290 (2013).
125. See Smith et al., supra note 124, at 291. This research “expands on
Kessler’s” research by observing people’s reactions first-hand, as opposed to
asking them how they think they would react. Id. at 289.
126. Id. at 300.
127. Id. at 301. The encounters were structured to involve either one, two,
or four officers confronting both individual and group subjects. Id. at 300. The
encounters took place during the day and the evening both inside and outside
university buildings. Id.

2015]

Silence is Not Golden

837

answer a single question or walked away at any point. 128 When
interviewed after the encounter, 129 60% of the subjects said they
complied because of the “authority, or the status of police in
society.” 130 Also, many subjects reported that they viewed the
encounter as nonconsensual due to the officer’s power over
them. 131 The researchers concluded that “the untested judicial
assumption that police-initiated encounters are consensual is
flawed.” 132 According to their research, “[e]ven without physical
restraint, force or commands, reasonable people are constrained to
comply with authority.” 133
This research strongly supports the contention of the
dissenting Justices in Salinas that it is the circumstances
surrounding an interrogation that should be pivotal. 134 In Salinas,
“[t]he context was that of a criminal investigation. Police told
Salinas that and made clear that he was a suspect. His
interrogation took place at the police station.” 135 These factors
make it obvious that the right to remain silent “was at issue at the
critical moment here.” 136 Under circumstances such as those
present in Salinas, requiring express invocation puts the
reasonable suspect in “an impossible predicament.” 137 Thus, “to
allow comment on silence directly or indirectly can compel an
individual to act as ‘a witness against himself’ – very much what

128. Id.
129. Immediately after the encounter with the officers, researchers asked
each participant why he complied, whether he believed he could ignore the
officers and walk away, and if he viewed the encounter as consensual. Id. at
301.
130. Id. at 308. Responses included: “[b]ecause he’s an officer”; “[h]e’s
security . . . [h]e has authority”; “[i]t’s security . . . [y]ou do what they say”;
“[t]hey are in charge”; “[h]e has authority over me”; and “[b]ecause it’s the
cops.” Id. at 309.
131. Id. at 305. Even though some subjects knew they had a legal right to
walk away or ignore the officer, they still complied. Id. at 292.
132. Id. at 320.
133. Id.
134. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that it
is the “[c]ircumstances, not a defendant’s statement, [that] tie the defendant’s
silence to the right [to remain silent]”).
135. Id. at 2189.
136. Id. at 2190.
137. Id. at 2186; see also O’Neill, supra note 72 (explaining that if the
suspect remains silent, “this can be used against him . . . [a]nd if he takes the
stand to explain his silence, the prosecutor may then be able to impeach him
with prior convictions that would have been otherwise inadmissible”); The
Editorial Board, The Right to Remain Silent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2013, at
SR12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/opinion/sunday/theright-to-remain-silent.html?_r=0 (stating that this decision “gives police
officers too much leverage to coerce or cajole a suspect into answering their
questions – to compel incriminating testimony in direct contradiction of the
Fifth Amendment – or, just as bad, into making a false confession when he is
innocent”).
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the Fifth Amendment forbids.” 138

IV. PROPOSAL
This Section proposes a new exception to the express
invocation requirement, an exception that balances the needs of
police to efficiently and effectively fight crime with the right of
suspects to remain silent.

A. The New Exception to the Express Invocation Rule
The Salinas decision aimed to “prevent the privilege [against
self-incrimination] from shielding information not properly within
its scope.” 139 However, the Fifth Amendment plainly guarantees
that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.” 140 Salinas leaves vulnerable to this very
type of compulsion a category of suspects who find themselves in a
particular set of circumstances. To fully achieve the Fifth
Amendment’s intention to prevent a person from being compelled
to be a witness against himself, while also permitting the use of
information that falls outside the scope of the privilege, a new
exception to the express invocation requirement should be
recognized.
This new exception would excuse a suspect’s failure to
expressly invoke the privilege where the police initiated contact
with him, made it clear to him that he was a suspect in a criminal
case, and interrogated him in or on police property, including a car
or a station, respectively. This exception should apply only where
each of these three circumstances are present and should only
prevent the suspect’s silence – not words – from being used
against him. Ultimately, this new exception would shield those
innocent suspects who do not feel at liberty to refuse to comply
with the police because they are aware that the police have
evidence unfavorable to them and they see the police as authority
figures who have power over them. This specific situation creates
an undeniable sense of pressure which when combined with
interrogation in a police-dominated environment is likely to lead to
compulsion. Thus, under these specific circumstances, failure to
expressly invoke the privilege should be excused.

138. The Editorial Board, supra note 137. See also O’Neill, supra note 72
(stating that “the majority’s decision can be seen in the larger sense as
‘compelling’ an individual to act as ‘a witness against himself’”).
139. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2176 (plurality opinion). The Court recognized
that a suspect may remain silent “because he is trying to think of a good lie,
because he is embarrassed, or because he is protecting someone else” and
declined to extend the protection to these ambiguous silences. Id. at 2176.
140. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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B. Recognizing the Popular Misconception
One of the main practical issues that the Salinas Court
recognized, but then blatantly disregarded, 141 is the fact that most
Americans have long believed they have a fundamental “right to
remain silent” and are unaware that they must expressly invoke
it. 142 Although the Court says this is just a “misconception,” 143 that
characterization does not change the fact that many Americans act
in reliance on this erroneous belief. 144 The entire Miranda decision
and warnings are premised on the idea that people must be aware
of their rights to exercise or waive them. 145 The Court stated that
“[f]or those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply
to make them aware of it – the threshold requirement for an
intelligent decision as to its exercise.” 146 This logic applies with the
same force here. A person unaware of the requirement to expressly
invoke the privilege cannot be said to have deliberately forfeited
his right to it.
The proposed exception would take care of this practical issue
by forbidding any silence from being used against certain suspects.
It takes into account the fact that nearly all law-enforcement
dramas on TV have convinced people that they have a right to
remain silent and their silence will not be used against them. 147 It
also reflects the reality that the typical suspect is “unlikely to
formally assert his Fifth Amendment right” because he is not a
lawyer and likely will not be thinking “in terms of legal
formalities” 148 during interrogation. Finally, it does not ignore the
fact that when the typical suspect fails to expressly invoke, he is
not really forfeiting his right to remain silent, rather, he is merely
141. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182–83 (plurality opinion) (stating that
Justice Alito believes that, “popular misconceptions notwithstanding,” the
Fifth Amendment does not guarantee an unqualified “right to remain silent”).
142. The general public can recite by memory a version of the Miranda
warnings starting with “[y]ou have the right to remain silent.” Matthew
Bromund, You Have The Right To Remain Silent, But Do You Have The
Ability?, BROMUND L. GROUP (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.bromundlaw.com/
blog/2013/10/you-have-the-right-to-remain-silent-but-do-you-have-the-ability/.
143. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182 (plurality opinion).
144. See id. at 2191 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that ignoring this
misconception “poses a serious obstacle to those who, like Salinas, seek to
assert their basic Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, for they are likely
unaware of any such linguistic detail”).
145. See Miranda, 284 U.S. at 467–68 (explaining that a person must be
informed of his right to remain silent).
146. Id. at 468.
147. See Amy Purpura, Understanding Rights after Salinas v. Texas, W.
VA. WATCHDOG (July 16, 2013), http://westvirginia.watchdog.org/4288/under
standing-rights-after-salinas-v-texas/ (stating that “nearly everyone knows
that one of our civil liberties is the right to remain silent” from popular law
enforcement shows).
148. Kerr, supra note 65.
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uninformed. 149

C. The Meaningless Distinction
The proposed exception takes care of the problem that the
distinction between in-custody and not in-custody is often
meaningless. 150 In Miranda the Court extended a layer of
protection to those who are involved in a custodial interrogation. 151
In Salinas, the Court excused custodial suspects from the express
invocation requirement and allowed them to exercise their right to
remain silent by remaining silent. 152 Yet, when approached by a
police officer, many people feel coerced solely because the police
are authority figures. 153 No great leap of logic is required to
conclude that this feeling of coercion would escalate if the person
were told he was a suspect in a criminal case. Few people feel they
can decline invitations to comply, 154 thus, they are in a situation
that is the practical equivalent of being in-custody, experiencing
the same kind of pressure as those in custodial interrogations.
Making the distinction between a person who is technically
“in-custody” and one who is not is a semantic game that does not
reflect the perceptions of the American nor work to protect him
from governmental coercion, as the Fifth Amendment intends to
do. As the Court explicitly recognized in Miranda, “coercion can be
mental as well as physical.” 155 It is hard to imagine that a person
who is aware that they are a suspect and who is asked to comply
with police in their authoritative capacity, is not under the same
kind of mental coercion as a person who has been placed under a
formal arrest. Thus, the proposed exception aims to protect these
149. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (stating that
“even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law”).
150. See Smith, et al., supra note 124, at 299 (explaining that although not
technically “in custody,” a person who is approached by a police officer and
who is told he is a suspect does not actually feel at liberty to refuse compliance
or to leave at any time).
151. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
152. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180 (plurality opinion) (stating that “a
suspect who is subjected to the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ of an
unwarned custodial interrogation need not invoke the privilege”).
153. Smith et al., supra note 124, at 290 (stating that 60% of the subjects
complied because of the “inherent authority of the officers”).
154. See Jan Hoffman, Police Tactics Chipping Away at Suspects’ Rights,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/29/nyregion/
police-tactics-chipping-away-at-suspectsrights.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm, (explaining that although people do not
realize they have the power to say no, courts make a distinction between
voluntary trips to the police station and ones that were made while
handcuffed).
155. Miranda, 284 U.S. at 448 (quoting Blackburn v. State of Alabama,
261 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)).
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suspects from being mentally compelled to become witnesses
against themselves.

D. Discouraging Manipulative Police Tactics
Finally, the proposed exception considers the very real
problem that police tactics are often used to circumvent a suspect’s
right to Miranda warnings and likewise his right to remain silent
without express invocation. 156 A person in custody is informed of
his rights via Miranda warnings and silence cannot be used
against him. 157 A person not in custody is not informed of his
rights and must invoke his right to remain silent in order to
benefit from it. 158 The Salinas decision creates an incentive for
police to choose the latter – to interrogate a suspect who does not
get Miranda warnings and who must (and probably will not)
expressly invoke his right to remain silent. 159 Police can simply
refrain from placing the suspect in custody in order to take
advantage of a non-custodial suspect’s lesser rights. This
“interrogate first, arrest later” tactic is an easy way for police to
undermine the fundamental rights of a criminal suspect. 160
Making a suspect’s silence off-limits under these circumstances
will reduce the incentive to use these manipulative tactics.

156. Officers are instructed to wait to arrest an uncooperative suspect to
avoid giving the Miranda warnings. Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning
Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1519, 1542–43 (2008). “If, however, the subject
appears to be uncooperative and not likely to waive, consider taking the
coerciveness (i.e., the ‘custody’) out of the interrogation by simply informing
him that he is not under arrest . . . and interview the subject without a
Miranda admonishment and waiver.”
ROBERT C. PHILLIPS, FIFTH
AMENDMENT; MIRANDA 3 (Oct. 2005), available at http://files.leagueathletics.
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CONCLUSION

Salinas poses practical problems that compromise the
purpose of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. It is an area that, without modification, will weaken
the basic rights of any citizen in the spotlight of a criminal
investigation. This new exception to the express invocation
requirement would take into consideration the fact that most
people believe they have an absolute right to remain silent, it
would eliminate an illusory distinction between in-custody and not
in-custody interrogations with regards to compulsion, and it would
discourage manipulative police tactics. Specifically, the exemption
would excuse a suspect’s failure to expressly invoke the privilege
only where the police initiated contact with him, made it clear to
him that he was a suspect in a criminal case, and interrogated him
in or on police property. It would protect those innocent suspects
who do not feel free to refuse to comply with the police because
they are aware that the police have evidence unfavorable to them
and they view the police as people with authority over them.
Ultimately, this exception would ensure that the original intent of
the Fifth Amendment – to protect a suspect from compulsion – is
fully realized, without barring the use of information that falls
outside the intended scope of the privilege.

